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 Theory makes ambiguous predictions about 
the relationship between market structure and 
competitiveness of the banking system and banking 
sector stability. Empirical studies focusing on individual 
countries provide similarly ambiguous results, while 
cross-country studies point mostly to a positive 
relationship between competition and stability in the 
banking system. Where liberalization and unfettered 
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competition have resulted in fragility, this has been 
mostly the consequence of regulatory and supervisory 
failures. The advantages of competition for an efficient 
and inclusive financial system are strong, and regulatory 
and supervisory policies should focus on an incentive-
compatible environment for banking rather than try to 
fine-tune market structure or the degree of competition.  
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1. Introduction 
Stability concerns are often at the center of banking sector policy debates.  After a 
relatively stable period between World War II and the 1970s, developed and developing 
countries alike have been hit by banking crises in the three decades since then.  While the 
early years of the 21
st century have seen a period of relative banking system stability 
around the world, recent turbulences linked to the U.S. subprime crisis have again caused 
concerns for policy makers, even in emerging economies that are not at the center of the 
storm.   
Competition in the banking market has been at the center of the policy debate on 
financial stability. As in other, non-financial, markets competition is often seen as pre-
requisite for an effective banking system.  Several theoretical and empirical studies, 
however, have shed doubts on this proposition, claiming that monopoly rents gives banks 
higher incentives to invest in relationships with smaller and more opaque borrowers.
1  
Similarly, theoretical and empirical studies have not come to a conclusive finding on the 
relationship between banking market competition and stability.  There is a notion that 
excessive competition can lead to fragility and restraints on competition are necessary to 
preserve the stability of the banking system.  Activity and branching restrictions put in 
place after the financial crises of the 1930s in many industrialized countries had the 
explicit goal of restricting competition. Financial liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s 
resulting in unchecked competition, on the other hand, has often been blamed for 
subsequent banking fragility in many developed and developing countries. Unfettered 
competition in the U.S. financial system has been partly blamed for the recent boom and 
subsequent bust in the subprime mortgage market.  
The past decades have also seen a rapid consolidation of banks around the world, 
which is intensifying concerns among policymakers about bank concentration, as 
reflected in major reports by the Bank for International Settlements (2001), International 
                                                 
1 While theory and some empirical work suggest that market power might entice banks to invest in long-
term relationships with small and opaque enterprises as they know that they can regain the initial 
investment in the relationship at a later stage (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia, 2004), other empirical papers point to the healthy effect of competition on availability of 
lending to SMEs (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004). See Berger 
et al. (2004) for an overview.  Monetary Fund (2001), and the Group of Ten (2001). This consolidation has happened 
not only within countries, but also across countries.  The past decades have seen a wave 
of foreign bank entry in many developing countries, and, more recently, there have also 
been cross-border mergers in many developed financial systems, most notably within 
Europe. Consolidation has happened both within business lines but also across business 
lines, resulting in financial conglomerates that offer commercial and investment banking, 
insurance and pension fund services.  While consolidation has often been justified by 
efficiency and scale economy arguments, the process of consolidation and the resulting 
financial conglomerates have given rise to stability concerns.  Specifically, the size and 
complexity of these institutions might undermine proper regulation and supervision by 
both markets and authorities; their size and critical role across different segments of 
financial systems might make it difficult for authorities to intervene and potentially close 
such as institutions, a phenomenon known as “too-big” or “too-important-to-fail.” 
What are the effects of bank competition and the consolidation process on the 
stability of banking systems around the world?  While seemingly opposing trends, 
consolidation does not necessarily imply less competition, as such consolidation can take 
place across different business lines or markets or create fewer, but more competitive 
players. Both competition and consolidation, however, have raised stability concerns 
among policy makers. This paper summarizes the existing literature and tries to derive 
policy conclusions.  This is an important topic for policy makers for several reasons.  
First, given different policy goals such as deepening, broadening and stability of financial 
systems, it is important to understand whether there are trade-offs across these different 
policy goals with respect to competition.  Second, given the array of regulatory policies at 
the disposal of policy makers, it is important to understand how they affect competition 
and stability as well as how they vary across different competitive environments in their 
effect on stability.  
The discussion on the relationship between bank competition and stability has 
been made difficult by measuring both stability and competition appropriately, as we will 
discuss in section 2.  While we will not review exhaustively the literature on banking 
distress or on measuring bank competition, understanding both concepts is important for 
the remainder of the discussion.  Section 3 turns to the theoretical literature, which has derived different predictions concerning the effect of competition on bank stability. 
Albeit sometimes arbitrary, for presentational purposes, we organize the literature into 
two opposing views, the competition-stability and competition-fragility hypotheses. 
Section 4 presents the results of empirical studies.  We distinguish between bank-level 
studies focused on one country, on the one hand, and more recent cross-country studies, 
on the other hand. While the bank-level studies do not provide unambiguous findings on 
the relationship between competition and stability, cross-country studies point mostly to a 
positive relationship. In addition, the review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
allows two conclusions: first, it is important to consider the interaction of regulatory 
policies and market structure and, second, bank concentration is not an appropriate 
measure of bank competition and any effect of bank concentration on stability works 
through channels other than bank competition.  Section 5 uses the theoretical and 
empirical findings to define the policy space for policy makers, also taking into 
consideration the related literature on bank regulation and banking system stability.  
Section 6 concludes and points to future research directions.  
It is important to define what this paper does not cover.  First, the paper is focused 
on domestic bank competition; the increased financial integration in the EU – while of 
increasing importance for policy makers and regulators – will not be specifically touched 
upon in this paper.  Second, an important dimension of competition, as pointed out by 
Claessens and Laeven (2004), is foreign bank entry.  While we do not cover this literature 
in this paper, our policy discussion will make reference to the findings of this literature.  
It remains to be stressed that this paper reflects the current state of knowledge.  As 
discussed in the Conclusions, more research is needed, especially in light of new markets 
and products.  
2.  Measuring Stability and Competition  
In order to test the relationship between stability and competition, we need appropriate 
measures of both.  Bank stability is mostly measured in a negative way, i.e. by 
considering individual or systemic bank distress.  Systemic banking distress can be 
broadly defined as periods where the banking system is not capable of fulfilling its 
intermediation function (deposit taking, lending, payment services) for the economy effectively anymore.  In this paper, we follow the definition by Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 2002) who define banking distress as systemic if (i) non-performing 
assets reached at least 10 percent of total assets at the peak of the crisis, (ii) the fiscal cost 
of the rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP, (iii) emergency measures, such as 
bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees to depositors or other bank creditors, 
were taken to assist the banking system, or (iv) if large-scale bank nationalizations took 
place.
2  More difficult than defining a crisis is the exact timing, i.e. the start and the end 
year, and most cross-country papers therefore subject their analysis to alternative 
definitions of the exact crisis periods. 
Using this definition of systemic banking crises, Honohan and Laeven (2005) find 
116 systemic banking crises in 113 countries over the period 1974 to 2002, which 
illustrates how widespread financial crises have become across the globe (Figure 1).  
Both developed and developing countries have been hit by systemic crises, with fiscal 
costs of up to 55% of GDP in Argentina in the early 1980s.  The 1980s and 1990s have 
been characterized by a relatively large number of banking crises.  During this period, at 
least 20 countries were in a systemic banking crisis at the same time; ranging from such 
diverse countries as Japan and U.S. to Argentina and West Africa. In addition to systemic 
crises, there were numerous nonsystemic banking crises, which disturbed the normal 
functioning of banking business. 
While systemic banking crises top the list of bank supervisors’ and policy makers’ 
concerns, individual bank fragility can also be worrying, as it puts countries’ financial 
safety net under pressure (Beck, 2004). Several systemic banking crises have started as 
crises in individual banks. Furthermore, the failure of large international banks present in 
several countries can have important repercussions for cross-border financial activities, as 
the example of Herstatt in 1974 has shown.  Today’s important cross-border financial 
sector dependencies have become clear in the recent crisis when first signs of distress in 
the U.S. subprime market showed up in several German banks.  
Individual bank distress can be measured in terms of proximity to bankruptcy or 
entry into bankruptcy. Specifically, researchers often use the z-score, which is the sum of 
capital-asset ratio and return on assets, weighted by the standard deviation of return on 
                                                 
2 See also Caprio and Klingebiel (1999). assets (Boyd, de Nicoló and Jalal, 2006). The resulting ratio indicates the number of 
standard deviations in return on assets that a bank is away from insolvency and thus the 
likelihood of failure.  Alternatively, researchers have used the non-performing loan ratio 
as fragility indicator.  Unlike the z-score, this measure focuses on credit risk and cannot 
be related directly to the likelihood of failure.  Neither of the two measures considers 
actual failure of banks.  
Even more difficult than measuring bank stability is measuring bank competition.  
Here, the literature has used a variety of measures, which can be broadly classified into 
three groups. First, there are market structure measures such a concentration ratios, 
number of banks or Herfindahl indices. These indicators measure the actual market 
shares without allowing inferences on the competitive behavior of banks. They are rather 
crude measures that do not take into account that banks with different ownership behave 
differently and that banks might not compete directly with each other in the same line of 
business.  Most importantly, the literature has not come to a conclusion on whether 
market structure determines bank behavior (structure-conduct-performance hypothesis) 
or market structure is the result of performance (efficient structure hypothesis).
3    
Second, competition measures, such as the H-Statistics, which measures the 
reaction of output to input prices, gauge the competitive behavior of banks, but impose 
certain restrictive assumptions on banks’ cost function.  Specifically, under perfect 
competition, increases in input prices cause total revenue and marginal cost to move 
together, while in imperfect competition they do not.  However, the inference from this 
measure derived from the profit-maximizing condition is only valid if the market in 
question is in equilibrium.  Estimates of the H-Statistics vary widely, as the studies by 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2007) show.  Similarly, the 
Lerner index indicates a bank’s market power by considering the ratio between marginal 
cost and price, which should be equal in perfect competition, but will diverge in less 
competitive environments.  Specifically, the ratio of price to marginal cost decreases in 
                                                 
3 See Berger et al. (2004) for a discussion of this literature. the degree of competitiveness. Importantly, the price has to be properly adjusted for 
lending risk.
4   
Third, indicators of the regulatory framework can provide indications of the 
contestability of the banking system.  Such measures include entry requirements, formal 
and informal barriers to entry for domestic and foreign banks, activity restrictions and 
other regulatory requirements, which might prevent new entrants from challenging 
incumbents.  However, one can include even the wider institutional framework among 
these indicators, such as the contractual and informational framework, a topic to which 
we will return to in section 5. 
An additional challenge in measuring competition is to properly define the 
relevant market.  Cross-country studies typically define an economy as the relevant 
market, not necessarily a correct assumption.  Studies for the U.S. have typically focused 
on the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as the relevant market.  Further, market 
structure and competition indicators are typically measured on the institutional level, 
rather than the product level; i.e. competition is assumed to be the same across different 
product lines, such as deposit, lending and payment services.  
3.  Bank Competition and Stability: What Does Theory Predict? 
Theoretical models have made contrasting predictions on the relationship between bank 
concentration, competition and stability.
5  These predictions might differ in static and 
dynamic models and have important interactions with elements of the regulatory 
framework, such as deposit insurance. Most theoretical models do not make a distinction 
between market structure, such as concentration, and competition, but rather assume a 
one-to-one mapping from market structure to competitive behavior of banks.  In the 
following, we will summarize the theoretical literature under two headings, depending 
whether the model predicts a positive or negative relationship between competition and 
stability. 
                                                 
4 Other performance measures such as interest rate spreads and margins are not necessarily good indicators 
of the competitiveness of a banking system as they are driven by other bank- and country-specific factors, 
such as bank size and business, contractual framework, taxation and macro performance.  See Beck (2007) 
for a discussion.  
5 See Carletti and Hartmann (2003) for an in-depth literature survey and Allen and Gale (2004) for an 
excellent exposition on the different theoretical mechanisms that can lead to contrasting relationships 
between competition and stability.  
3.1. Competition-fragility  hypotheses 
Some models predict that more concentrated and less competitive banking systems are 
more stable, as profits provide a buffer against fragility and provide incentives against 
excessive risk taking. This “charter value” view of banking, as theoretically modeled by 
Marcus (1984), Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1986), and Keeley (1990), sees banks as 
choosing the risk of their asset portfolio.  Bank owners, however, have incentives to shift 
risks to depositors, as in a world of limited liability they only participate in the up-side 
part of this risk taking.   In more competitive environment with more pressures on profits, 
banks have higher incentives to take more excessive risks, resulting in higher fragility. In 
systems with restricted entry and therefore limited competition, on the other hand, banks 
have better profit opportunities, capital cushions and therefore fewer incentives to take 
aggressive risks, with positive repercussions for financial stability. In addition, in more 
competitive environment, banks earn fewer informational rents from their relationship 
with borrowers, reducing their incentives to properly screen borrowers, again increasing 
the risk of fragility (Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Allen and Gale, (2000, 2004).  These 
models thus predict that deregulation resulting in more entry and competition, such as in 
the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s and in many emerging markets, would lead to more 
fragility.  
More concentration and less competition can also have positive repercussions for 
liability risk. Smith (1984) shows that less competition in banking leads to more stability 
if information about the probability distribution of depositors’ liquidity needs is private 
and lower competition allows banking relationships to endure for longer periods. Matutes 
and Vives (1996), however, argue that concentration is not a consistent signal of 
competition, so that bank illiquidity can arise in any market structure. Specifically, a 
bank’s distress probability is determined endogenously by depositor’ expectations 
resulting in the possibility of multiple equilibriums.  
Another channel through which competition can impact stability is the interbank 
market and payment system. As shown by Allen and Gale (2000), perfect competition 
can prevent banks to provide liquidity to a peer that is hit by a temporary liquidity 
shortage.  If all banks are price takers, no bank has incentive to provide liquidity to the troubled bank, with the result that this bank will eventually fail with negative 
repercussions for the whole sector. Saez and Shi (2004), on the other hand, show that a 
limited number of banks can cooperate, act strategically and help a bank with temporary 
liquidity shortages.  
What regulatory policies can enhance banks’ charter value and thus prudent risk 
taking? Deposit insurance can reduce fragility by preventing bank runs (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983), but also introduces moral hazard and risk shifting into the banking system 
by providing increased incentives to banks to take excessive risk and reduced incentives 
for market participants to monitor.  A reduction in charter value and more generous 
deposit insurance can thus act in a multiplicative way to undermine bank stability.  
Matutes and Vives (1996) show that deposit insurance schemes can prevent a systemic 
confidence crisis and overcome the coordination failure problem in their model of 
multiple equilibriums.  At the same time, however, deposit insurance schemes can 
increase unhealthy competition between banks, reduce diversification benefits and 
ultimately increase failure probability. Cordella and Yeyati (2002) show that with fixed-
rate deposit insurance schemes, higher competition increases deposit interest rates and 
risk, while lowering profits.  With risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums, on the other 
hand, banks can credibly commit to lower asset risk, thus lowering cost of funding even 
in competitive environments. Perrotti and Suarez (2003) show that bank failure policies 
that aim for mergers of failing banks with healthy banks increase the incentives of banks 
to take prudent risk, as the “last bank standing” increases its charter value. At the same 
time, an active entry policy can reduce negative effects of increasing concentration in the 
banking market.  The model by Perotti and Suarez also underlines the importance of 
taking into account dynamic incentive effects for banks.  
Another popular regulatory measure is a minimum capital requirement for banks, 
to thus boost the charter value and reduce incentives for excessive risk taking. Hellmann, 
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), however, show that even with capital requirements, deposit 
interest rate ceilings are still necessary to prevent banks from excessive risk-taking in 
competitive markets. 
A somewhat different argument of proponents of the competition-fragility 
hypothesis is that more concentrated banking systems have larger banks, which in turn allows them to better diversify their portfolios.  Models by Diamond (1984), 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986), Allen 
(1990), and others predict economies of scale in intermediation. While the “large-bank” 
argument does not rely directly on competition in the market place, it is an important side 
effect of market structure. 
A final argument refers to the number of banks to be supervised by the 
authorities. If a more concentrated banking system implies a smaller number of banks, 
this might reduce the supervisory burden and thus enhance overall banking system 
stability. According to Allen and Gale (2000), the U.S., with its large number of banks, 
supports this “competition-fragility” view since it has had a history of much greater 
financial instability than the U.K or Canada, where the banking sector is dominated by 
fewer larger banks. As in the case of bank size, this argument is about the market 
structure in banking, not the competition that this implies.  
 
3.2. Competition-stability  hypotheses 
While the charter-value hypothesis predicts that more concentrated and less competitive 
banking systems are more stable, an opposing view is that a more concentrated banking 
structure results in more bank fragility.  First, Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) argue that the 
standard argument that market power in banking boosts profits and hence bank stability 
ignores the potential impact of banks’ market power on firm behavior. Rather than banks 
choosing the riskiness of their assets, it is the borrowers who choose the riskiness of their 
investment undertaken with bank loans. They confirm that concentrated banking systems 
enhance market power, which allows banks to boost the interest rate they charge to firms.  
Boyd and De Nicoló’s (2005) theoretical model, however, shows that these higher 
interest rates may induce firms to assume greater risk, which results in a higher 
probability that loans turn non-performing.  Thus, in many parameterizations of the 
model, Boyd, and De Nicoló (2005) find a positive relationship between concentration 
and bank fragility and thus the probability of systemic distress.
6  Similarly, Caminal and 
                                                 
6 Martinez-Miera (2008), however, shows that higher interest rates also imply higher interest revenues for 
banks, which might result in a U-shaped relationship between competition and bank fragility.  Matutes (2002) show that less competition can lead to less credit rationing, larger loans 
and higher probability of failure if loans are subject to multiplicative uncertainty.    
Second, advocates of the “competition-stability” view argue that (i) relative to 
diffuse banking systems, concentrated banking systems generally have fewer banks and 
(ii) policymakers are more concerned about bank failures when there are only a few 
banks.  Based on these assumptions, banks in concentrated systems will tend to receive 
larger subsidies through implicit “too-big” or “too important to fail” policies that 
intensify risk-taking incentives and hence increase banking system fragility (e.g., 
Mishkin, 1999).  Further, having larger banks in a concentrated banking system could 
also increase the contagion risk, resulting in a positive link between concentration and 
systemic fragility. 
Proponents of the competition-stability view would also disagree with the 
proposition that a concentrated banking system characterized by a few banks is easier to 
monitor than a less concentrated banking system with many banks.  The countervailing 
argument is that bank size is positively correlated with complexity so that large banks are 
harder to monitor than small banks.  Holding all other features of the economy constant, 
concentrated banking systems tend to have larger banks. Further, the recent consolidation 
trend has also led to financial conglomerates offering a whole array of financial services, 
previously offered by specialized institutions, another complicating factor for bank 
supervisors.  Thus, this argument predicts a positive relationship between concentration 
and fragility. 
4.  Bank Competition and Stability: What Do the Data Tell Us? 
We can distinguish between several strands of empirical literature, which allow us to 
infer on the relationship between market structure, competition and stability. Up until 
recently, the literature either focused on one country or on the comparison of two 
countries.  Only recently, the availability of large cross-country, time-series data sets has 
enabled cross-country studies to assess the relationship between competition and 
stability.  
 
4.1. Bank-level  evidence In a seminal paper, Keeley (1990) provides evidence that increased competition 
following the relaxation of state branching restrictions in the 1980s reduced banks’ 
capital cushions and increased risk premiums reflected in higher interest rates on 
certificates of deposit.  Overall, this suggests that higher competition in the U.S. eroded 
charter values and resulted in higher bank fragility in the 1980s. This is consistent with 
Dick (2006) who finds evidence of increased charge-off losses and loan loss provisions 
following deregulation in the 1990s, but contradicts findings by Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1998) who find that branch deregulation resulted in a sharp decrease in loan losses. 
Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) find for a sample of Spanish banks for the period 
1988 to 2003 that banks with higher market power, as measured by the Lerner index, 
have lower non-performing loans, thus providing evidence for the charter value 
hypothesis.  Notably, they do not find any significant relationship between market 
structure, as measured by concentration ratios, and non-performing loan ratios.  
As discussed by Calomiris (2000) and Calomiris and Mason (2000), an extensive 
literature finds an inverse relationship between bank scale and bank failure in the United 
States. Boyd and Runkle (1993), examining 122 U.S. bank holding companies, find that 
there is an inverse relationship between size and the volatility of asset returns, but no 
evidence that large banks are less likely to fail. Boyd and Graham (1991, 1996) find that 
large banks were more likely to fail in the U.S. during the period 1971 to 1986, but less 
likely in the period 1987 to 1994.  De Nicoló (2000), on the other hand, finds a positive 
and significant relationship between bank size and the probability of failure for banks in 
the U.S., Japan and several European countries.    
An extensive strand of literature infers the effect of market structure and 
competition on bank fragility by assessing the effect of mergers creating larger banks and 
increasing market concentration. Paroush (1995) points to higher bank stability caused by 
increases in market power stemming from diversification gains after mergers. Benston, 
Hunter and Wall (1995) and Craig and Santos (1997) also point to positive diversification 
and thus stability gains from bank mergers in the U.S. However, empirical work by 
Chong (1991) and Hughes and Mester (1998) indicates that bank consolidation tends to 
increase the riskiness of bank portfolios. De Nicoló and Kwast (2001) assess the direct and indirect interdependencies of 
large and complex U.S. banking organizations (LCBO) arising from inter-bank on- and 
off-balance sheet exposures, including linkages through the payment and settlement 
systems) by considering the correlation of their stock returns.  They find that these 
correlations increased between 1988 and 1999, as did the market share for these LCBOs, 
interpreting this as evidence for an increase in systemic risk in the U.S. banking system, 
partly as consequence of consolidation. 
A few descriptive studies have compared banking market structures and stability 
across pairs of countries.  Bordo, Redish and Rockoff (1996) observe a greater stability of 
Canadian banks than of U.S. banks and relate this to the oligopolistic market structure in 
Canadian banking, compared to the higher degree of competition in U.S. banking.  On the 
other hand, in spite of higher profitability, there are no indications of less competition in 
the Canadian market. Comparing the UK and German banking systems, Hoggarth, Milne 
and Wood (1998) find more competition and less stability in the UK; Staikouras and 
Wood (2000) find more competition and more stability in the Spanish than in the Greek 
banking system.   
Summarizing, there is no clear conclusion from these different empirical studies 
on the validity of either the competition-stability or the competition-fragility hypotheses. 
Two conclusions, however, can be drawn.  First, a higher degree of market concentration 
does not necessarily imply less competition. Specifically, testing for the relationship 
between market structure and stability and for the relationship between competitiveness 
and stability does not necessarily yield the same results.  Second, as predicted by several 
theoretical studies, there is an important interaction effect between the regulatory and 
supervisory framework, on the one hand, and market structure and competitiveness, on 
the other hand, in their effect on banking system stability. 
 
4.2 Cross-country  studies 
The recent availability of large cross-country time-series datasets has initiated a new 
wave of literature assessing the validity of the different theoretical models.  Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006 a,b) build on the crisis prediction work by Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002) to assess the competition-stability and competition-fragility hypotheses.  Specifically, using standard panel logit models, they assess whether 
the probability that a country suffers a systemic banking crisis in a specific year depends 
on the concentration of the banking system, controlling for other banking system, 
macroeconomic and institutional factors that the literature has shown to be associated 
with the probability of a banking crisis  They find that more concentrated banking 
systems are less likely to suffer systemic banking crises, a finding that is robust to a 
number of different specifications and controlling for an array of other factors potentially 
associated with crises.  Table 1 presents these results for a sample of 69 countries and 47 
crisis episodes over the period 1980 to 1997. These findings hold when they control for 
general measures of bank competition.  When analyzing the channels through which 
concentration might be positively associated with banking system stability, they find 
tentative evidence that more concentrated banking systems allow better possibilities for 
banks to diversify risk.  On the other hand, they do not find any evidence, that it is easier 
for bank supervisors to monitor more concentrated banking systems or that the higher 
stability results from the market power and consequent franchise value of banks in more 
concentrated banking systems.  Bank concentration is thus not an indicator of the lack of 
competition. Rather, more competitive banking systems are also less likely to suffer 
systemic banking distress. 
Boyd, de Nicoló and Jalal (2006) arrive at a different conclusion using bank-
individual fragility data. Rather than focusing on systemic bank distress, they use the z-
score, a bank-level measure of distance from insolvency as fragility indicator. Unlike 
Beck et al. (2006a,b), they find banks are closer to insolvency, i.e. more likely to fail, in 
countries with more concentrated banking systems.  Cross-country results on the effect of 
concentration thus vary depending on whether one considers individual bank fragility or 
systemic banking distress. It is important to note, however, the different concepts these 
studies consider – actual systemic banking distress vs. the probability of individual bank 
fragility; the latter might not necessarily result in the former.   
Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2006) find a negative relationship between bank 
competition and systemic bank fragility using a more refined measure of competition in 
the banking market – the H-Statistics.  Specifically, using a sample of 38 countries over 
the period 1980 to 2003, they show that more competitive banking systems are less prone to systemic distress and that time to crisis is longer in more competitive banking systems 
(Table 2).
7   Unlike Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, however, they do not find an 
independent link between bank concentration and systemic banking fragility. The 
differences in this finding, however, could be due to the smaller sample utilized by 
Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe. Schaeck and Cihak (2007) identify bank capitalization as one 
of the channels through which competition fosters stability.  Utilizing data for more than 
2,600 European banks, they show that banks have higher capital ratios in more 
competitive environments.  
Finally, there is cross-country evidence that regulatory policies that restrict entry 
and banks’ activities are negatively associated with bank stability.  Specifically, Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2004) and Beck et al. (2006 a,b)  find that banking systems with more 
restrictions on banks’ activities and barriers to bank entry are more likely to suffer 
systemic banking distress, while capital regulations are not significantly associated with 
the likelihood of suffering a crisis.  Limiting contestability of the banking sector thus 
seems to undermine rather than to strengthen bank stability, a result contradicting the 
charter value hypothesis.  
Overall, the cross-country evidence points mostly to a positive relationship 
between bank competition and stability, but yields mixed results on the relationship 
between concentration and stability.  This also underlines that market structure measures, 
such as concentration ratios are inadequate measures of bank competition.  Higher 
concentration might result in more stability through channels other than lack of 
competitiveness, such as improved risk diversification.  The rather clear picture arising 
from the cross-country studies is somewhat in contrast to the ambiguous findings 
emerging from country-specific bank-level studies, which can be explained by the fact 
that the latter do not control for the regulatory framework.  
 
5.  Bank Competition and Stability: Policy Implications 
                                                 
7 Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007) find different results for a smaller sample of eight Latin American 
countries in the 1990s.  Specifically, they find that banks in more competitive banking systems are more 
fragile, as measured by the z-score and the non-performing loan ratio. This contrasting result might be 
explained by the contemporaneous increase in foreign bank penetration in these countries, which resulted in 
lower competition.  The empirical cross-county results point to overall positive effects of competition on 
stability, while they yield contradictory results on the relationship between bank 
concentration and stability. They also underline that crude market structure measures, 
such as concentration ratios, are not good measures of competition.  Overall, maintaining 
a competitive and contestable banking system seems to have positive repercussions for 
stability. At the same time, allowing growth of banks even if it implies more concentrated 
banking systems might have benefits in terms of risk diversification.  
While the empirical findings reported so far have important policy implications, it 
is difficult, for several reasons, to translate them directly into a policy agenda. First, 
market structure, such as the number of bank or market share of the largest banks, is not 
directly subject to policy actions in market-based financial systems.  Second, many 
regulatory measures that are associated with banks’ competitive behavior have other, 
more direct, effects on bank stability than through their effects on competition. We will 
discuss these different regulatory policies in turn. 
A large literature has pointed to the risks of financial liberalization in a weak 
institutional environment (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).  This literature points 
to the dark side of competition in terms of its relationship with individual and systemic 
bank fragility.  Most importantly, theory and international experience with liberalization 
episodes over the past thirty years show that liberalization in an environment where 
banks can shift risk to the taxpayer leads to excessive and imprudent risk taking, often 
resulting in systemic banking distress.  Most recently, the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. has 
shown how an increase in the number of competing lenders can result in declining 
lending standards at times of loose monetary policy and financial innovation such as 
securitization that allowed easier risk shifting (Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven, 2008).  
While proper regulatory safeguards (entry requirements, capital regulations, liquidity 
requirements etc.) and effective bank supervision are important, an incentive compatible 
financial safety net that forces banks to assume the consequences of their risk decisions 
seems especially important.  
It is in this context, that restrictions on banks’ activities have often been imposed 
to prevent financial conglomerates from emerging.  Similarly, deposit interest rate 
ceilings and other restrictions have been proposed to prevent unhealthy competition and excessive risk taking leading to fragility (Hellmann, Murdock, and Sitglitz, 2000).  While 
theoretically attractive, they are difficult to implement, monitor and enforce in reality, 
especially in the weak institutional environment they are designed for and might prevent 
banks from reaping necessary diversification and scale benefits.  Critically, they can 
easily serve as cover for rent-seeking activities, allowing incumbent banks to protect their 
rent, and can result in political regulatory capture.  Not surprisingly, Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999) find that the strength of lobby groups related to small banks and insurance 
companies – segments of the financial sector standing to lose from branch deregulation in 
the U.S. – determined the speed with which states abandoned branching restrictions in the 
1970s and 1980s.  Mexico offers a well-studied example, where regulatory capture led to 
a suboptimal privatization process and subsequent bank distress in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Haber, 2005).
8 
The role of deposit insurance schemes has been especially controversial.  While 
often introduced to protect small depositors’ lifetime savings and to prevent bank runs, 
they also provide perverse incentives to banks to take aggressive and excessive risks.  
These perverse incentives are held less in check in weak supervisory frameworks 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).  While several of the theoretical studies 
discussed above point to risk-based premiums as solution, other elements such as 
management of the scheme, compulsory membership and link with the remainder of the 
financial safety net are important characteristics as well (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; 
Beck and Laeven, 2008).  
Another important area that interacts with competition is bank failure resolution, 
as shown by Perrotti and Suarez (2003). A combination of an active merger and 
acquisition policy for banks and a liberal entry policy can give banks incentives to take 
prudent risks, wile at the same time maintaining contestability of the banking system.  An 
important issue in the context of increasing consolidation has been the issue of “too-big” 
or “too-important-to-fail” banks.  A clear policy of governments is necessary on how to 
address large failing banks that are systemically important.  While intervention and 
government support for such institutions might be unavoidable in times of distress, a 
                                                 
8 See Haber and Perotti (2008) for a recent survey on the relationship between politics and finance.  clear and transparent framework on who takes the decision and assumes the cost is 
necessary.    
The institutional structure of financial sector supervision can be an important 
factor as well.  The recent trend towards consolidated supervision has been justified with 
the trend towards financial conglomeration across different segments of the financial 
system and the need to create an even regulatory playing field.  Theory suggests that the 
separation of responsibility for monetary and financial stability and thus also for lender-
of-last resort facilities and bank failure resolution might create stability-enhancing 
incentives (Kahn and Santos, 2005).  Empirical analysis of these questions is still 
outstanding and previous conclusions on the ideal institutional structure might have been 
put in doubt by the different reactions to the recent crisis.  
The contractual and informational framework can also plays an important role in 
interacting with the market structure and competition. Take the example of credit 
information sharing, which numerous studies have shown to be associated with better 
access to credit (Love and Mylenko, 2003 and Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2007), but 
also with better credit decisions by banks. For instance, Powell et al. (2004) use the actual 
data in the public Argentine credit registry to show that availability of system-wide 
registry information can substantially improve the precision of credit decisions even for a 
large bank.  This has important positive repercussions for bank stability.  Effective 
systems of credit information sharing have thus positive ramification for competition, 
lowering barriers to entry, and stability.  
Another important issue for policy makers, though not covered in the previous 
sections, is foreign bank entry.
9  Claessens and Laeven (2004) show that foreign bank 
participation is an important dimension of competition in the banking system.  Numerous 
studies have shown that foreign bank participation has contributed to rather than 
weakened financial sector stability, as often feared by policy makers in developing 
countries (see Cull and Martinez Peria, 2007, for a literature overview).  Specifically, 
Cull and Martinez Peria (2007) show, using data on the share of banking sector assets 
held by foreign banks in over 100 developing countries during 1995-2002, that countries 
that experienced a banking crisis tended to have higher levels of foreign bank 
                                                 
9 Claessens (2006) reviews the effect of cross-border banking on bank competition. participation than those that did not. Importantly, however, foreign participation 
increased as a result of crises rather than prior to them. 
While foreign bank entry is mostly positively related to banking system stability, 
government ownership has mostly a negative impact on both competitiveness of the 
banking system and its stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004; Caprio and Martinez 
Peria, 2002). 
A final consideration is competition from the non-bank financial sector and 
capital markets.  As both the East Asian crisis and the recent sub-prime crisis in the U.S. 
have shown, fragility can start from non- or underregulated non-bank segments of the 
financial system.   This does not imply limiting interlinkages between different segments 
of the financial system, but rather calls for a regulatory and supervisory framework that is 
focused on financial products rather than institutions and avoids possibilities of 
regulatory arbitrage resulting in risk shifting to less-regulated segments.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effect of competition on banking 
stability. Empirical research has been made difficult by finding proper measures of bank 
competition.  Cross-country research has found that more concentrated banking systems 
are less likely to suffer from systemic banking distress.  On the other hand, more 
competitive banking systems are also less likely to suffer from systemic banking distress.  
Bank-level analyses give less clear indications, however, and are often confounded with 
regulatory changes in the country being analyzed.  
The tentative conclusion of this paper is that competition per se is not detrimental 
for banking system stability in a market-based financial system with the necessary 
supporting institutional frameworks.  Policies associated with more competitive financial 
systems – fewer activity restrictions, lower entry barriers, openness to foreign bank entry 
– have also been found to be associated with higher stability.   However, it is important to 
note the necessary institutional frameworks for countries to reap maximum benefits from 
competition.  While unchecked competition can lead to fragility in weak institutional 
environment, it is important to focus in improving these frameworks, rather than limiting 
competition, at least in the long term.  Restrictions put in place at times of financial liberalization to allow upgrading of regulatory and supervisory frameworks and 
capacities should be temporary and have clear sunset clauses.  
Stability is one important concern of policy makers in the financial sector, but 
should not be the only one. Deep and efficient financial systems are important for 
economic growth and poverty alleviation (Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007). Even if there were a trade-off between competition 
and stability, it is ex-ante not clear whether stability should have a higher priority than 
efficiency, which has clearly been shown to be linked to higher degrees of competition.  
It is more, there is evidence that countries with deeper but more volatile financial systems 
have grown faster over the period 1960 to 2000 than countries with low but stable levels 
of financial deepening (Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann, 2006, 2008).  The positive 
growth effect of financial liberalization thus outweighs the negative crisis effect. This is 
also confirmed by theoretical work that shows that Schumpeterian competition, i.e. 
competition through innovation, in the financial system can lead to individual bank 
failures, but also to higher innovation and thus efficiency in the financial system (Allen 
and Gale, 2004).   Designing institutions, including regulatory policies, to create efficient 
financial markets that allocate society’s savings to their best use and support real markets, 
should therefore be the primary concern of policy makers.  Given the increasing evidence 
that competition per se does not cause financial fragility, it seems important to focus on a 
regulatory framework and a financial safety net to support competitive and efficient 
financial markets, rather than restraining competition.  
The literature surveyed in this paper and the conclusions point to further much 
needed research.  Better measuring competition (on the product rather than institutional 
level and taking into account input markets and access to network services, such as the 
payment system) and banking distress beyond credit risk will be an important challenge. 
As countries’ financial markets become more integrated, as for example in Europe, it is 
important to design regulatory frameworks and financial safety nets that allow reaping 
the maximum benefit of this increased competition, while aligning incentives of the 
different stakeholders to reduce the risk of bank fragility.  The recent crisis has reminded 
us that regulatory and supervisory frameworks need constant updating as new products, 
markets and interlinkages emerge.  References 
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 Table 1.  Bank Concentration, Regulation and Systemic Stability 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8 Concentrationj,t+  β9 Regulatory measurej,t +  εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of 
one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the growth rate of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate.  Inflation 
is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  
Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Concentration equals the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample 
period.  Moral Hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with variations in deposit insurance design features. Fraction of entry denied measures the number of entry 
applications denied as a fraction of the total received.  Activity restrictions captures bank’s ability to engage in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and 
selling, and in real estate investment, management, and development.  Required reserves is the percentage of reserves regulators require to hold. Capital regulatory index is a 
summary measure of capital stringency. Official Supervisory Power is an index of the power of supervisory agency to enforce prudential regulations on banks. State ownership is 
the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned. Foreign ownership is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% 
or more foreign owned. Banking freedom is an indicator of relative openness of banking and financial system, while economic freedom is a composite of 10 institutional factors 
determining economic freedom. KKZ_composite is an aggregate measure of six governance indicators. White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. The sample period is 1980-1997. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006b) 























Moral Hazard  0.037 
(0.075) 
          
Fraction of Entry Denied    1.885*** 
(0.737) 
         
Activity Restrictions      0.166** 
(0.072) 
        
Official Supervisory 
Power 
    -0.021 
(0.166) 
       
Required  Reserves       0.016   
(0.016) 
      
Capital  Regulatory  Index        -0.079   
(0.129) 
     
State  ownership         0.015* 
(0.008) 
    
Foreign  ownership          -0.005   
(0.008) 
   
Banking  freedom           -0.506*** 
(0.165) 
  
Economic  freedom            -0.513*** 
(0.225) 
 
KKZ_composite             -0.439** 
(0.201) 
No.  of  Crises  47 21 34 34 27 33 32 31 47 47 47 
No.  of  Observations  989 583 767 767 572 755 686 609 955 955 989 
%    crises  correct  66 62 68 62 63 61 66 68 68 66 68 
%    correct  71 81 79 78 77 79 74 73 70 70 72 
Model χ
2  37.93*** 29.34*** 38.21***  38***  30.46*** 37.62*** 30.97*** 34.15*** 52.41*** 47.58*** 49.59*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  Table 2: Bank Competition and Systemic Stability 
Source: Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2006) 
 Figure 1: Crisis frequency  
This graph shows the number of countries that were in a systemic or non-systemic crisis at a given year. Source: 
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